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The Political Economy of Molecules: 
 















Could the most miniscule of objects, imperceptible to the human eye, enact whole new political 
economies? The suggestion may seem odd, but this article reveals how tiny molecules are already 
engendering new regimes of value across the fields of global health and biodefense. Delving 
genealogically into the onto-epistemology of the life sciences, the article traces the protracted 
molecular reconfigurations of state-market relations underpinning the global bioeconomy and 
civilian biodefense today. Using methodological precepts developed through assemblage thinking, 
this evolving patchwork of new constellations is conceptualized as a global molecular assemblage. 
Attending to this lively play of molecules in the world, the article argues, advances the post-
Foucauldian, molecular study of biopolitics by exploring how scientific shifts in our ‘vital epistemics’ 
contour state-market relations. It further contributes to the development of a post-human 
international political economy that is more sensitive to the ways in which artefacts (like molecules) 
too exhibit particular kinds of ‘agency’ and ‘force’ in the world. Finally, it enhances the field’s ability 
to make unconventional, hitherto overlooked, and multi-scalar connections in the study of political 
economy through the creative use of assemblage thinking. In the case of molecules, such 






 medical countermeasures 







Economics is how lifeforms organise their enjoyment. 
– Timothy Morton, Humankind (2017) 
 
Introduction 
New molecules can possess the most unusual of names. Before they are worked up into fully-fledged 
pharmaceutical products suitable for human consumption, they are often identified solely by a short 
combination of letters and numbers associated with the company that first developed them. ST-246 
is one such molecule developed by a comparatively small US pharmaceutical company called Siga 
Technologies. A few years ago, their new molecule caught the eye of the Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority (BARDA) – a specialized US government agency tasked with 
procuring new pharmaceutical defences against health-based threats such as pandemics, 
bioterrorism and anti-microbial resistance. BARDA was interested in ST-246 because the molecule 
showed promising activity against the smallpox virus, which the US government had become 
concerned about as a potential weapon of bioterrorism. If it were possible to develop this promising 
new molecule into a viable pharmaceutical product, then the US government could add it to its 
burgeoning national stockpile of ‘medical countermeasures’ protecting the population and economy 
against biological danger. 
There was just one catch; and it was a big one. A lot of costly and technically complex 
advanced development work would still need to be carried out in order to transform ST-246 into a 
safe and effective medical countermeasure. Clinical trials would first have to be carried out. 
Approval from the official regulatory agencies, like the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
would need to be secured. Mass production facilities would also have to be designed for 
manufacturing and stockpiling the new pharmaceutical product at high volume. As a comparatively 
small biotechnology company (with only around 65 employees at the time), Siga Technologies 
possessed neither the work force, the finances, nor the technical expertise to carry out all this 
advanced development work on its own (Love 2011). ‘Drug development is such a capital-intensive 
process’, Kaushik Rajan explains, ‘that very few companies have the muscle to actually take a drug to 
market’ (Rajan 2006: 45). To become a viable new medical countermeasure against the smallpox 
threat, ST-246 would require extensive outside support. 
At this point, and rather than abandoning the fate of ST-246 to the vagaries of commercial 
markets alone, the US government decided to step in. Despite the country’s public valorisation of 
‘free’ markets and laissez-faire capitalism, the government directly intervened into the play of 
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market forces and, in 2011, officially supported Siga Technologies with the advanced development 
of ST-246 through a 5-year contract worth US$ 433 million (HHS 2011). That decision rendered ST-
246 one (and a rather illustrious) example of a growing number of molecules passing through a new, 
multi-faceted and increasingly extensive public-private pharmaceutical regime that has been 
designed in the United States for the specific purposes of developing novel ‘medical 
countermeasures’ against biological threats. How does the political economy of this new medical 
countermeasures ‘enterprise’ differ from more conventional approaches to drug development in the 
fields of global health and biomedicine? What role did molecular knowledges developed in the life 
sciences play in brining about the significant transformations of state-market relations that now 
underpin this new medical countermeasures enterprise? What, moreover, becomes of international 
political economy when we commence its study not with macro-structures like states or markets – 
but with the tiniest of molecules like ST-246?  
This article argues that molecules are highly pertinent, powerful and even generative ‘actors’ 
in international political economy. The article develops this argument by showing, first, how a 
substantial proportion of the world economy today revolves around the commercialization of 
biological products and processes – what political economists variously refer to as the ‘bioeconomy’, 
‘biovalue’, ‘biocapital’ or simply ‘biotech’ (Birch and Tyfield 2013). The article next undertakes a 
closer genealogical interrogation of the ‘bio’ residing at the heart of this global bioeconomy, 
revealing that it actually entails a very particular onto-epistemic shift towards the ‘molecular’ in the 
life sciences. The global bioeconomy is, in fact, a political economy of molecules. Using key 
methodological precepts developed through assembling thinking – such as exterior relationality, 
heterogeneity, and multi-scalarity – the article then advances an original conceptualization of this 
global bioeconomy economy as a diverse, dynamic, and desire-driven molecular assemblage. Finally, 
the article traces how this open-ended global molecular assemblage is already evolving further 
because governments want to harness the power of molecules for the additional purposes of 
strengthening civilian biodefense by developing a range of new medical countermeasures. In 
mapping, tracing and analysing how the onto-epistemic shift towards a molecular vision of life is 
triggering protracted reconfigurations of state-market relations across the fields of global health and 
national security, the article is thus able to uncover the distributed ‘enrolment’ power that 
molecules exert in international political economy today. 
Attending to this lively play of molecules in the world has wider ramifications for the study 
of international political economy. Demonstrating how recent shifts in our ‘vital epistemics’ are re-
contouring state-market relations in subtle but powerful ways advances the post-Foucauldian, 
molecular study of biopolitics. Revealing the ‘agency’ that non-human artefacts and objects – like 
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molecules – exert during those processes helps to cultivate a post-human international political 
economy that remains more sensitive to the intricate connections between human life and the 
wider natural world. Teasing this ‘power’ of molecules out methodologically, moreover, also 
develops assemblage thinking as a creative approach for making unconventional, hitherto 
overlooked, and multi-scalar connections between processes, actors, objects, and knowledges in the 
study of international political economy. In the case of molecules, such assemblage thinking can – 
quite literally – reveal the value of ‘life’. 
 
1. Bio-Capitalizing: Bio-value, Bio-capital, and Bio-economies  
That our biological existence is integral to international political economy has been known at least 
since Michel Foucault showed how the development of capitalism in the 17th and 18th centuries 
witnessed the entering of human life ‘into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of 
political techniques’. For the first time in history, he famously argued, biological existence was 
reflected in political existence, giving rise to a new form of biopower. ‘Without question’, Foucault 
further asserted, such biopower was ‘an indispensable element in the development of capitalism’, 
because ‘the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic 
processes’ (Foucault 1978: 14). In The History of Sexuality he could thus convincingly demonstrate 
that society, politics, and economics are deeply enmeshed with our ‘biological’ life through a 
biopower manifesting along two principal axes – the micro-level of the individual human body 
(anatomo-politics), and the macro-level of the population (biopolitics). 
 Since those influential works were penned, however, the ‘biological’ has become pertinent 
to international political economy in other, and arguably even more direct, ways. Advances in 
biotechnology mean that the ‘biological’ is now itself also a site of capitalist value creation – from 
the development of new drugs for biomedicine and global health, through to the design of 
innovative approaches to food, energy and textile production. Improved scientific understanding 
(and control) of biological processes has incited a plethora of new regimes for creating ‘bio-value’; 
and a swarm of private biotechnology companies have already secured venture capital in order to 
seize upon those seemingly boundless commercial possibilities (Franklin 2000; Waldby 2002; Vettel 
2006; Helmreich 2008). Collectively, those activities have engendered a whole new ‘bioeconomy’ 
that is ‘based on the use of research and innovation in the biological sciences to create economic 
activity and public benefit’ (White House 2012: 7). All of this marks a quite significant change in the 
role that the biological plays in the world economy today. Whilst ‘the capitalist economy has 
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historically sought to capture the surplus labour power of individuals’, Parry and Greenhough (2017: 
12) argue, ‘new ventures now seek to extract value from commercializing access to biological 
products and processes themselves’. 
Governments and international organizations have evolved their economic strategies in 
order to actively transform this bio-revolution into a new engine of macro-economic growth 
(Petersen and Krisjansen 2015). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and European Commission, for example, explicitly pushed for the introduction of 
biotechnology into new economic platforms and partnerships; and they have buttressed a whole 
new ‘bioeconomy’ capable of capturing ‘the latent value in biological processes … to produce 
improved health and sustainable growth and development’ (OECD 2005: 5, cited in Cooper 2008: 
45). In the United States, the Obama Administration’s 2012 National Bioeconomy Blueprint similarly 
proclaimed that developing the U.S. bioeconomy could ‘allow Americans to live longer, healthier 
lives, reduce our dependence on oil, address key environmental challenges, transform 
manufacturing processes, and increase the productivity and scope of the agricultural sector while 
growing new jobs and industries’ (White House 2012: 1). Determining the exact size of this 
bioeconomy is difficult due to limitations with current data collection and classification, and because 
so much depends upon precisely how this bioeconomy is analytically delimited for the purposes of 
measurement (Carlson 2016; Wesseler and von Braun 2017). Yet recent reports already place the 
estimated value of this bioeconomy at more than $353 billion in economic activity in the United 
States alone (in 2012), whilst the European Commission estimates that the European bioeconomy 
(excluding health applications) is worth more than €2 trillion annually and employing in excess of 
21.5 million people (see CIB 2015).  
Governments have also provided extensive public support to this burgeoning bioeconomy 
through a range of economic strategies. Large amounts of public funding were made available to the 
life sciences in order to improve the scientific understanding of biological processes. In the United 
States, for example, the US National Institutes for Health (NIH) played a prominent leadership role in 
sequencing the human genome – reflecting a much broader trend whereby ‘the entire history of 
molecular biology’ is one ‘of federal funding of “basic research” that was meant to create the 
technical base necessary to understand and cure diseases’ (Kenney 1986: 241). The US government 
also introduced new legal frameworks to enable closer ties between academic research 
organizations and industry, so as to facilitate the smooth and rapid movement of emergent 
biological knowledges out of the life sciences and into the wider economy. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, 
for instance, aided such commercialization of basic scientific research by effectively allowing federal 
grantees (like scientists, universities and corporations) to patent and license discoveries resulting 
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from publicly funded research (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Rajan 2006:6; Helmreich 2008: 471; 
Hurt 2011; Vallas, Kleinman, and Biscotti 2011: 57). New juridical regimes have since also been 
developed (and expanded) in order to enable intellectual ‘property’ to become attached to these 
knowledges in the life sciences, and for such intellectual property claims to be asserted 
internationally via the World Trade Organization and TRIPS (Sell 2003; Rajan 2006; Williams 2012; 
Hilberg 2015).  
Such government support for the bioeconomy has not at all been confined to the United 
States and Europe. Joseph Wong’s Betting on Biotech documents in detail how governments in 
several Asian countries (notably Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) similarly provided an active array of 
public support for the bioeconomy, even if that support took different forms in different national 
contexts (Wong 2011). Further studies show that other geopolitically pivotal countries – like India, 
China and Russia – have similarly invested heavily in nurturing the bioeconomy (Rajan 2006; BioStep 
2018). In fact, more than 20 countries across the Americas, Europe, the Asia/Pacific and Africa have 
already developed strategies that explicitly identify the biotech sector as being critical to their future 
economic and employment growth (Carlson 2016: 247; BioStep 2018). Furthermore, all of those 
efforts have also been accompanied by geographically much broader global health initiatives, 
launched in the aftermath of the global AIDS pandemic, seeking to distribute the ‘fruits’ of this 
bioeconomy more equitably with all populations around the world – by expanding international 
access to medicines (like anti-retroviral therapy), and by developing new medicines for diseases 
prevalent in in low-income countries. Extensive support from governments around the world has 
given the bioeconomy increasingly global scope. 
Dominant tropes of ‘free markets’, ‘venture capital’, and an intensely ‘entrepreneurial’ 
biotechnology industry notwithstanding, then, governments and international organizations actually 
played a critical role in facilitating the rise of the ‘bioeconomy’ and in sustaining global ‘biocapital’ 
(Vallas, Kleinman, and Biscotti 2011). As Mariana Mazzucato argues more generally in The 
Entrepreneurial State, governments have played a highly pro-active role in nurturing the 
bioeconomy, and the private sector has mostly invested only after an ‘entrepreneurial’ state first 
made the initial, high-risk investments (Mazzucato 2013: 66). Focusing solely on the ‘mutual 
imbrications of capital and biology’ in the global bioeconomy, Rebecca Hester (2016: 176) rightly 
argues, would be to ignore ‘the role of the state in provoking those entanglements’. Just as the 
wider economy has always required government investments in public goods, ranging from 
infrastructure to national security, so too the global bioeconomy is indisputably a political economy 




2. Vital Epistemics: The Molecular Vision of Life 
A few pioneering scholars have begun to probe the ramifications of this burgeoning bioeconomy for 
the wider study of political economy. Melinda Cooper sensitises her readers to the strong market 
dynamics at play in what she calls ‘life as surplus’, and she firmly contextualizes the rapid rise of the 
biotechnology industry within the rise of neo-liberalism more broadly (Cooper 2008: 19). ‘The 
biotech era’, she argues, ‘poses challenging questions about the interrelationship between economic 
and biological growth, resurrecting in often unexpected ways the questions that accompanied the 
birth of modern political economy’ (Cooper 2008: 3). Kaushik Sunder Rajan takes a different 
approach by comparing the new regimes of value engendered in the area of biomedicine in the 
United States and India (2006; 2012; 2017). Eschewing an overtly epochal account, Rajan develops 
the notion of ‘biocapital’, which ‘simultaneously manifests as a specific case study of systems of 
capitalism – one situated lens through which we can view the emergence of capitalist logics and 
systems writ large – and a particular form of capitalism made specific because of emergent 
technologies and epistemologies of the life sciences’ (Rajan 2006: 78). Those early and ground-
breaking accounts of the bioeconomy remain highly compelling; yet framing all these developments 
merely as the ‘bio’ ultimately also occludes as much as it captures. Although it has become pervasive 
now, this ‘bio’ framing does not tell us very much about the precise nature of the ‘biological’ that 
resides at the heart of this global bioeconomy.  
Interrogating the ‘bio’ genealogically reveals that it actually entails a very particular and 
specific way in which the life sciences now understand the ‘biological’ predominantly in molecular 
terms (Kay 1993, 2000; Rose 2007; Elbe 2014; Hester 2016). The scale at which we can understand 
(and manipulate) the ‘biological’ has thus become progressively smaller over the past century – 
moving first from the level of the human body to the inner workings of the cell, and later burrowing 
even deeper to the scale of individual atoms embedded in their respective molecular groupings. 
Scientific techniques like x-ray crystallography eventually even allowed the exact molecular structure 
of DNA to be revealed and visualized, all of which played such a crucial part in the discovery (in 
1953) that the DNA molecule exists in the form of a three-dimensional double helix (Pray 2008: 100). 
DNA sequences can now represent biological life in terms of a manipulable string of molecular 
information expressed in quite simple – if also extremely long – code (Abir-Am 1992; Dillon and Reid 
2001). That realization, Michael Kenny (1986:2) argues, would form the ‘key discovery on the road to 
the creation of biotechnology’. 
 The rise of the global bioeconomy thus relies upon what is in fact a critical double movement 
in relation to the ‘biological’ – or what Karen Barad in a very different context (2007: 43; 185) calls a 
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new ‘onto-epistemology’. In a first step, the molecular vision of ‘life’ asserts an ontology because it 
construes ‘life’ as being fundamentally governed by underlying biological processes. This endows 
‘life’ with a (new) biological ‘source’, foundation and basis (Doyle 1997: 87); and marks ‘the 
reduction of the human body to its constituent molecules’ (Hester 2016: 178). Ultimately, this new 
molecular ontology even extends beyond the human world to encompass all living entities, whose 
existence becomes grounded now in a common set of molecular ‘building blocks’. This is also the 
aspect of the ‘biological’ most readily captured by the widespread ‘bio’ framing.  
At the same time, this molecular vision of life signals an equally profound epistemological 
shift. It asserts that the truth of this (biological) life can now be revealed through the specific 
knowledges and epistemes of the molecular – especially via the detailed study of the potentially vast 
combinations of DNA sequences that form ‘the information source for the operation of the cell’ 
(Kenney 1986: 20). ‘Molecular biology’, one of its most prominent pioneers put it plainly, ‘is nothing 
more than the search for explanations of the behaviour of living things in terms of the molecules 
that compose it’ (Brenner 1974: 785, cited in Kenney 1986: 18). Here the molecular vision of life thus 
begins to open up a whole new epistemology for knowing ‘life’ in which, as the sociologist Nikolas 
Rose puts it, life is now studied ‘as a set of intelligible vital mechanisms among molecular entities 
that can be identified, isolated, manipulated, mobilised, recombined, in new practices of 
intervention, which are no longer constrained by the apparent normativity of a natural vital order’ 
(Rose 2007: 5-6). This onto-epistemic shift towards the molecular marks a key permutation in the 
underlying bios of biopower, and one that has largely unfolded only after Foucault’s highly original 
studies were carried out (Dillon and Reid 2001).  
 All of this, moreover, suggests there is ultimately something ‘deeper’ at play in the 
emergence of the global bioeconomy that is not adequately captured by the widespread ‘bio’ 
framing. What matters most for the rise of the global bioeconomy, in the end, is not merely the 
‘biological’ per se; but in fact a very specific way in which this biological is now understood and 
imagined as being inherently molecular. It is the detailed molecular knowledges, approaches and 
techniques in the life sciences that herald the prospect of creating new regimes of value based upon 
improved human understanding and control of biological processes. Indeed, all three of the major 
scientific and technological breakthroughs credited with underpinning the global bioeconomy – 
genetic engineering, DNA sequencing, and robotic technologies performing high-throughput 
molecule operations – are intimately bound up with the rise of the ‘molecular’ (White House 2012: 
7). The case of ST-246 illustrates this point only all too well by, because it was precisely such 
molecular knowledges that allowed for the initial identification, as well as subsequent technical 
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optimisation, of a tiny new molecule that could interfere with the replication of smallpox viruses 
inside the host body (Grosenbach et al. 2011). 
Kaushik Rajan is closest to acknowledging the pertinence of these molecular foundations of 
the global bioeconomy when he writes that biotechnology such as recombinant DNA technology 
‘allow the life sciences to become “technological”, where the product that is produced is cellular or 
molecular matter such as DNA or protein’, thereby opening up the very ‘possibility and the rationale 
for this burgeoning biotechnology industry’ (Rajan 2006: 5). Yet Michael Kenney manages to express 
this intimate connection between the bioeconomy and the molecular even more succinctly still: ‘The 
core discipline for the biotechnology industry’, he argues, ‘is molecular biology….’ (Kenney 1986: 10; 
see also Braun 2007; Hester 2016). The ‘bio’, in other words, is ultimately the ‘molecular’; and the 
global ‘bioeconomy’ is therefore a political economy of molecules. If that is true, moreover, then it 
does become possible to suggest in earnest that the tiniest of molecules can engender a whole new 
political economy. In fact, the recent rise of the global bioeconomy is proof that they have already.  
 
3. The Global Molecular Assemblage 
The deeper insight gained from this genealogical excavation of the bioeconomy’s molecular 
undercurrents is only short-lived however. It is quickly offset by three thorny conceptual challenges 
that immediately present themselves now, even though they largely remain unacknowledged in the 
literature. If the global bioeconomy is grounded in the molecular, and if it is molecules that 
ultimately connect all of these different actors, then how are we to theoretically incorporate the 
generative ‘force’ and even ‘power’ that molecules are exerting over these dynamics? We can no 
longer account for the rise of the global bioeconomy without accommodating the key role of the 
molecules that reside at its heart. How, furthermore, do we analytically reconcile the quite 
staggering, and even extreme, variations in scale that we are now left confronting? Macro-structures 
like states, markets and international institutions will somehow need to be conceptually connected 
to molecules so tiny that they cannot even be perceived by the naked human eye. How, finally, are 
we to do justice to the significant multiplication and diversification of pertinent actors that this 
molecular excavation also entails? In addition to governments and pharmaceutical companies, there 
are now so many other actors that need to be accommodated because they too work directly on, 
with, or through molecules. This includes a plethora of human actors like scientists, knowledge 
brokers, patent lawyers, judges, doctors, patients, editors of scientific journals, journalists, and so 
forth. Yet it also includes key material infrastructures like universities, hospitals, laboratories, and 
research funding bodies, as well as an array of less tangible and affective elements similarly bound 
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up with the world of molecules – like information, visualizations, techniques, desires, imaginaries, 
hopes, and fears (see Clough 2008). Excavating the molecular foundations of the bioeconomy 
produces deeper insight, but only at the cost of triggering a vexing cluster of new conceptual 
challenges not easily reducible to conventional state-market analysis. 
One approach emerging across the social sciences that is particularly well suited for coming 
to grips with these kinds of conceptual challenges is assemblage thinking. Early adoptions of the 
notion of the ‘assemblage’ in the field of political economy tended to use the term mostly in a 
descriptive sense (see Sassen 2008; Abrahamsen and Williams 2009). Recently, more extensive 
engagements with assemblage theory have begun to explore the field of international finance 
(Schwittay 2011; McKeen-Edwards & Porter 2013; de Goede 2015). Yet assemblage thinking can also 
offer a useful, and even creative, resource for navigating the conceptual challenges around the 
political economy of molecules. Gilles Deleuze once famously defined an assemblage, with 
characteristic flair, as ‘a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms and which 
establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and reigns – different natures. Thus, 
the assemblage’s only unity is that of a co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’ (Deleuze and 
Parnet 2007). Expressed more prosaically, and bearing in mind that Deleuze himself never advanced 
a formal systematic theory of assemblages, an assemblage thus refers ‘to any collection of 
heterogeneous elements that can be said to display some form of consistency and regularity while 
remaining open to transformative change through the addition or subtraction of elements or the 
reorganization of the relations between those elements’ (Bousquet 2018: 167).  
We will refer to this approach here as assemblage ‘thinking’ (as opposed to ‘theory’) in order 
to signal the fact that it deliberately represents more of an overall philosophical approach, idiom or 
ethos for thinking about the world, rather than a fully delimited analytical theory of political 
economy (for contrarian views see DeLanda 2016 and Nail 2017). As McFarlane and Anderson (2011: 
126) argue in a different context, assemblage thinking is less about testing pre-existing hypotheses, 
and more about conceptual experimentation that ‘opens the researcher up to risk, embraces 
uncertainty, expresses something of the fragility of composition, and strives to listen to what 
Deleuze and Guattari term “the sound of a contagious future, the murmur (rumeur) of new 
assemblages of desire, of machines, and of statements, that insert themselves into the old 
assemblages and break with them”’. Approached in this spirit, assemblage thinking offers 
considerable traction in navigating the three conceptual challenges that have just opened up in 
studying the global political economy of molecules. 
First, the notion of the ‘assemblage’ is a particularly well calibrated analytical category for 
capturing the bioeconomy as a loose global formation encompassing a wide range (and very large 
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number) of heterogeneous actors all coalescing, in one way or another, around the molecular. An 
assemblage is thus neither a set of predetermined parts put together in orderly, sequential and pre-
determined fashion; but neither is it merely a random collection of things (Wise 2011: 91). An 
assemblage is always ‘a whole of some sort that expresses some identity and claims a territory. An 
assemblage is a process of becoming that brings elements together’ (Wise 2011: 91). The properties 
of this ‘whole’ are necessarily emergent because they do not result just from aggregating the 
properties of its component parts; they also emerge from the detailed interactions that unfold 
amongst and between those component parts (Sesay et al. 2016: 5). With regard to the political 
economy of molecules, the notion of the ‘assemblage’ can thus usefully accommodate the presence 
of an extensive number of highly diverse actors, components, knowledges, and affective elements 
that all need to be conceptually accounted for, whilst at the same time capturing the fact that they 
are all loosely connected with one another through a common interest in molecules – thus also 
forming a kind of emergent unity expressed in the form of the global ‘bioeconomy’.  
Second, assemblage thinking is conceptually curious about the ways in which phenomena 
occurring at radically different scales can nevertheless connect and interact with one another in 
quite unexpected ways. Assemblage thinking can thus traverse quite extreme scalar variations ‘by 
accounting for the successive embedding of smaller assemblages within larger assemblages and 
elucidating the connections between them…’ (Sesay et al 2016: 5). More than that, and as the 
assemblage theorist Manuel DeLanda argues, ‘[b]ecause the ontological status of all assemblages is 
the same, entities operating at different scales can [also] directly interact with one another, 
individual to individual, a possibility that does not exist in a hierarchical ontology’ (DeLanda 2016: 
19-20). Assemblage thinking, in that sense, even ‘requires a democracy of scale’ (Harman 2014: 120, 
emphasis in the original). This aspect of assemblage thinking, too, is particularly attractive in the 
case of the global bioeconomy because it allows for the possibility that macro-structures like states, 
markets, and institutions might also be contoured by the tiniest of objects like molecules. Not only 
does assemblage thinking remain conceptually open to this possibility; its non-hierarchical ethos 
actively seeks out how phenomena occurring at radically different scales are nevertheless connected 
with one another in often quite unexpected ways. 
Finally, assemblage thinking is also highly attentive to the role played by non-human 
elements or components in the world. One of the most controversial aspects of the approach (which 
it shares with Actor-Network Theory) is that assemblage thinking explicitly underscores ‘the 
importance of the socio-material, i.e. that the world is made up of associations of human and non-
human elements’ (Müller and Schurr 2016: 218). From the perspective of assemblage thinking ‘the 
“human” comes to be seen as a component, not the limit, of society’ (Acuto and Curtis 2014: 2). 
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Assemblage thinking therefore does not deny the existence of human agency. In fact, assemblages 
frequently consist of a heterogeneous multitude of both ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’. Yet the approach is 
ultimately much more interested in the relational co-functioning of those heterogeneous 
components as a composite whole (Sesay et al 2016: 3-4). That is also why assemblage thinking is 
conceptually quite comfortable with ascribing particular forms of ‘agency’ to non-human objects and 
artefacts as well. It understands ‘agency’ here not in the traditional humanistic way (i.e., with a 
restricted focus on human actors, intentionality and conscious reflexivity); ‘agency’ is instead 
understood more broadly ‘as an effect or as the modification of a state of affairs’, and as something 
that can encompass almost anything ‘that has an impact and makes a difference in the world’ 
(Bueger and Stockbruegger 2018: 50). All of this makes assemblage thinking inherently open to the 
possibility that objects and artefacts like molecules too can exhibit particular forms of ‘agency’ and 
‘power’ in the global bioeconomy. As Deleuze once famously put it, the ‘object itself is force, 
expression of force’ (Deleuze 2006: 6). 
Using those three methodological precepts developed through assemblage thinking – 
heterogeneity, exterior relationality, and multi-scalarity – we can thus summarily conceptualize the 
‘bioeconomy’ as a dynamic molecular assemblage. In his careful theoretical reconstruction of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s deliberately dispersed writings on assemblages, Thomas Nail (2017: 24) 
argues that the basic structure of assemblages is always made up of three components: their 
‘abstract machine’ (conditions), their ‘concrete assemblage’ (elements), and their ‘personae’ 
(agents). The ‘abstract machine’ is what sets out the critical exterior relations that condition the 
various components of an assemblage – in this case the abstract notion of the ‘bioeconomy’ or ‘bio-
capital’. The ‘concrete assemblage’ is ‘the existing embodiment of the assemblage’, or a kind of 
‘skeletal’ frame; in this case all the human, material and affective elements involved in the worldly 
play of molecules (Nail 2017: 26). That is also why conceptualizing the bioeconomy as a molecular 
assemblage does not, emphatically, imply that this assemblage consists only of molecules 
(themselves assemblages of atoms); it merely signals the fact that it is this common concern with 
molecules that places all of these heterogeneous components of the assemblage into a loose and 
unifying exterior relation. The ‘personae’, finally, refers to all ‘the mobile operators that connect the 
concrete elements together according to their abstract relations’ – in this case also those actors 
going about the labour of extracting different kinds of value from molecules (Niall 2017: 27). Yet 
because so many of these molecular connections are increasingly drawn at global scale, and because 
molecular rationalities move across (whilst also re-adapting to) different national contexts, we will 





4. The Assemblage Within: Biodefense and the Valley of Death  
To properly qualify as an assemblage, the global bioeconomy must also pass one final litmus test. 
Assemblages cannot be static or fully enclosed; they are ‘never unifications, never totalizations, but 
rather consistencies or consolidations’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 589).  Assemblages are 
inherently open systems because particular elements can always join and/or leave them, and 
because the relations amongst the components can change over time. An assemblage is thus 
‘precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it 
expands its connections’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 7; see also Hayden 1995: 294; Müller and 
Schurr 2016: 219; Dittmer 2017: 9-10). Such a process of further transformation in the global 
molecular assemblage is currently unfolding within the context of government efforts to better 
protect their populations and economies against a spectrum of health-based threats – like infectious 
disease outbreaks, the spectre of bioterrorism, and rising rates of anti-microbial resistance (Braun 
2007; Cooper 2008; Lakoff and Collier 2008; Elbe 2014; Rushton and Youde 2014; Hester 2016). 
 One of the principal ways in which governments are trying to strengthen and enhance 
civilian biodefense is by developing an array of new pharmaceutical defences, or ‘medical 
countermeasures’, that can be rapidly distributed to the population in the event of an emergency. 
Here too governments thus want to harness the power of emergent molecular knowledges in order 
to proactively develop a whole arsenal of novel antibiotics, anti-virals, anti-toxins, antidotes, anti-
bodies, and next-generation vaccines (Elbe 2018; Milne and Smith 2018). ‘Our nation’, extols the U.S. 
government in this vein, ‘must have the nimble, flexible capability to produce medical 
countermeasures rapidly in the face of any attack or threat, whether known or unknown, novel or 
reemerging, natural or intentional’ (PHEMCE 2013; Elbe et al. 2015). Ongoing efforts to procure 
those new medical countermeasures have recently spawned a whole new ‘medical 
countermeasures’ assemblage aimed at using molecular knowledges and technologies to generate 
additional security value. 
The US government has been at the international forefront of those efforts; but even it 
initially struggled to procure such novel medical countermeasures. Pharmaceutical development is 
mostly undertaken by the private sector in accordance with market forces (Dumit 2012; Roy 2017); 
and there is no ready commercial market for medical countermeasures because they are aimed at 
quite rare and highly unpredictable diseases (Bartfai and Lees 2013; Elbe 2018). The few large 
pharmaceutical companies with the requisite knowledge, experience and financial clout to bring new 
pharmaceutical products to market thus tend to steer a wide berth around medical 
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countermeasures. Most promising new molecules with medical countermeasure potential (like ST-
246) never see the light of day as a result; they remain perpetually stuck in the critical mid- to late-
stages of pharmaceutical development – what industry experts metaphorically refer to as the ‘valley 
of death’ (Tucker 2009: 225; Hoyt 2012:155). The pharmaceutical industry’s overriding desire for 
commercial profit thus prevents it from readily realizing the governments’ desire for acquiring new 
medical countermeasures as part of their evolving national security strategies (Elbe 2018). Procuring 
new medical countermeasures is unlikely to succeed via the commercial bioeconomy route, and will 
require the development of a different kind of molecular assemblage. 
Following a number of early and costly setbacks, the US government eventually decided to 
launch an ambitious new Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (Wizemann 
et al. 2010). The economic strategies underlying that new medical countermeasures ‘enterprise’ 
have not been subject to sustained analysis (Gronvall 2015; for a notable exception regarding 
vaccines see Hoyt 2012). Yet they reveal how the US government inventively drew upon several 
subtle strategies that it had earlier deployed in relation to the wider civilian economy. Behind the 
‘veil’ of dominant public ideas about market fundamentalism in the United States, Fred Block (2008) 
argues, the federal government has long played a central role in financing and supporting the role of 
the private sector to commercialize new technologies – pointing to a ‘hidden’ and networked 
developmental state. In order to procure those desired new medical countermeasures, the US 
government now mobilized some of those same strategies, albeit adapting and re-combining them 
in new ways through a creative mix of formal institutionalization, targeted resourcing, and 
technological brokering (see Block 2008: 173; Block and Keller 2011). Collectively, those strategies 
have led to the creation of a specialized new medical countermeasures assemblage operating within 
the parameters of the wider global molecular assemblage – effectively spinning a new assemblage-
within-an-assemblage for the purposes of civilian biodefense and national security. 
As a first step, and echoing the earlier creation of other institutions like the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) during the Cold War, the US government created a specialized new 
government institution in 2006 that would assist pharmaceutical companies during the later stages 
of new medical countermeasure development (Block 2008: 175; Mazzucato 2013). The new 
institution is called the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) and is 
the focal point now ‘for the advanced development and acquisition of medical countermeasures to 
protect the American civilian population against CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear] and naturally occurring emergency threats to public health’ (HHS 2016). BARDA is thus 
explicitly tasked by the government with helping (predominately smaller) pharmaceutical companies 
to shepherd their promising new molecules through the notorious ‘valley of death’ (Nicholson et al. 
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2016: 118). BARDA’s role would effectively be to mimic many of the activities normally performed by 
a large pharmaceutical corporation in the overall process of new drug development (Elbe 2018; see 
also Caldwell and Howard 2014). As one official put it, BARDA’s role is essentially to act as a virtual 
pharmaceutical company (Nicholson et al. 2016: 17). BARDA’s creation thus marks the addition of a 
critical new institutional component to the global molecular assemblage.  
Next BARDA began to draw new webs of exterior relations around key elements within that 
existing global molecular assemblage, so as to make the assemblage much more conducive to new 
medial countermeasure development. It altered, for example, the financial relations between those 
components through the provision of ‘targeted resourcing’ specifically for the late development 
stages of medical countermeasures, and whereby officials ‘provide funding and other resources that 
have promising ideas for achieving breakthroughs’ (Block 2008: 172). In the more conventional 
political economy of new drug development, the government usually only makes funding available 
to various actors (academic, government and also commercial) for carrying out basic research; but 
then it largely allows the market to ‘freely’ decide which products are taken forward for commercial 
development. Occasionally, the government may also provide wider non-financial incentives to 
energize research and development in particularly neglected disease areas. In the field of medical 
countermeasures, by contrast, up to 50 percent of the final contract can now be awarded to 
companies by the government via ‘milestone’ grants, and upon the successful achievement of 
intermediary development stages (HHS 2007:10). When it comes to medical countermeasures, 
pharmaceutical companies therefore no longer have to wait all the way until the very end of the 
drug development process before they can achieve revenues. Bringing the funding ‘forward’ in this 
way, and structuring the provision of government funding according to such ‘milestone’ payments, 
assists pharmaceutical companies in meeting the unforeseen changes in development costs, and 
helps them absorb some of the heightened technical development risk associated with new medical 
countermeasures. Yet it also deepens the extent to which the US government effectively becomes a 
risk-sharing ‘partner’ in the development of those new medical countermeasures. 
In addition to recalibrating those financial relations surrounding new molecules with medical 
countermeasure potential, the US government also tweaked the way in which technical expertise 
flows through the global molecule assemblage. Advanced drug development is not just costly, but 
also riddled with complex technical challenges; and many of the smaller pharmaceutical companies 
interested in developing new medical countermeasures were evidently struggling to acquire the 
expertise required for overcoming all the technical, regulatory, manufacturing, commercialization, 
and business challenges involved (HHS 2011: 12). BARDA thus additionally introduced extensive 
technical support that it can provide to companies through its ‘Core Services’ – like the Clinical 
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Studies Network assisting companies with carrying out clinical trials for new medical 
countermeasures. A separate Nonclinical Development Network further helps pharmaceutical 
companies with developing viable animal models, because it can be very difficult to carry out human 
clinical trials on some deadly diseases due to the dangers and ethical concerns it would give rise to 
(Smith 2013). BARDA is even able to provide pharmaceutical companies with access to relevant 
‘subject matter experts’, which BARDA often hires following many years of high-level experience in 
the private pharmaceutical industry. These measures have mostly been introduced piecemeal by the 
US government through a protracted process of trial and error. Yet collectively they have ended up 
spawning what is now effectively an ‘exceptional’ molecular assemblage operating specifically for 
new medical countermeasures in the United States (see Elbe et al. 2015). 
Molecules like ST-246 have already ‘benefitted’ extensively from this new medical 
countermeasures assemblage. Like many new molecules in commercial biomedicine, ST-246 
received early government support (via the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and 
the US Department of Defense) worth around US$ 115 million (HHS News 2011; Love 2011). Unlike 
other molecules destined for clinical biomedicine, however, Siga Technologies subsequently received 
a further multi-year contract from BARDA worth nearly half a billion dollars for the advanced 
development of the molecule (HHS News 2011). With the help of this additional support, ST-246 
managed to navigate the notorious ‘valley of death’ and, over the course of many years, became 
transformed into a new medical countermeasure – a small-molecule antiviral pill called TPOXX® 
(tecovirimat), and which received official FDA approval in July 2018 (FDA 2018). At the time of 
writing, BARDA is already acquiring nearly two million courses of TPOXX® for its Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS) of medical countermeasures through another multi-year contract valued at up to 
US$ 629 million (SIGA 2018). Yet ST-246 is also merely one of many such new molecules. BARDA 
reports that in the decade following its inception, it has been involved in a total of 24 medical 
countermeasures that have been cleared, approved, or licensed (Hatchett 2016: 5). Furthermore, 
BARDA has also provided wider support for the research and development of more than 180 medical 
countermeasures (Fassbender 2016).  
All of those newly developed medical countermeasures demonstrate how, via the creation 
the new medical countermeasures enterprise, the US government has been able to harness the 
power of molecules to create additional and novel forms of ‘bio-value’ in the area of national 
security. Yet the government could only do so through the careful reconfiguration of state-market 
relations for the specific purposes of civilian biodefense – reconfigurations which reverberate far 
beyond the territorial borders of the United States. For, those new knowledges and technologies 
created through this US medical countermeasure enterprise can also be shared with other countries 
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around the world during global health emergencies, whilst other governments with the requisite 
resources may similarly decide to purchase some of these new medical countermeasures for their 
own national stockpiles. Much of this acquired medical countermeasures expertise is also already 
informing much broader international public-private initiatives aimed at speeding up the 
development of new medicines and vaccines during global health emergencies – such as the 
international Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). It is, moreover, being 
increasingly applied to stimulate greater pharmaceutical innovation in relation to other pressing 
global health challenges like anti-microbial resistance (AMR). 
More broadly, the creation of this new medical countermeasures enterprise also marks a 
powerful illustration of how the emergent properties of assemblages can change due to the addition 
of new elements, and through the surfacing of new relations between components within the 
assemblage (Sesay et al 2016: 5). The new US medical countermeasures enterprise has not been 
created ‘from scratch’; nor has it been set up as a covert government program working outside of 
the parameters of the commercial bioeconomy. Rather, it has come about by drawing upon, and 
even openly working with, exactly the same components that already exist within the global 
molecular assemblage – like pharmaceutical companies, scientists, regulators, and so forth. In order 
to direct these existing elements towards the desired goal of developing of new medical 
countermeasures, the US government has ‘simply’ added a critical new institutional component to 
this wider molecular assemblage (in the form of BARDA), and begun to spin a new set of exterior 
relations (financial, technical, regulatory) around those existing elements. The new US medical 
countermeasures enterprise has effectively been spun out of (and within) the already existing 
molecular assemblage that is the global bioeconomy.  
That is also why the medical countermeasures enterprise does not, in the end, simply mark 
another chapter in the familiar ‘spin-off’ story, whereby innovative defence technologies end up 
producing economically beneficial applications – from jet engines, radar, and anti-biotics, through to 
nuclear technology, microchips and the internet (Ferry and Sulston 2002: 22). In fact, the medical 
countermeasures enterprise works exactly the opposite way around. In what Linda Weiss (2014) 
calls ‘spin-on’, the state draws upon new technologies emerging in the commercial or civilian sphere 
in order to develop new technologies that also strengthen its national security, and through which it 
can project its power abroad (Weiss 2014: 10). It is, in other words, not so much that new defence-
related medical countermeasures are spilling over into the civilian bioeconomy, but conversely that 
the civilian bio-economy is being productively harnessed in order to develop new technologies for 
the purposes of strengthening civilian bio-defence. The US medical countermeasures enterprise is 
essentially a highly specialized biodefense assemblage operating now within the confines of the 
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wider commercial assemblage for biomedicines. It marks a key transformation within this global 
molecular assemblage, whilst simultaneously existing in deep symbiosis with it. Yet it also shows 
how the tiniest of molecules have, in the end, managed to engender not just a new political 
economy in the form of the global bioeconomy; but in fact multiple ones operating concurrently now 
across the fields of commercial biomedicine and national security. 
 
Conclusion 
What does the study of international political economy gain from attending to this lively play of 
molecules in the world? First and foremost, analysing the political economy of molecules advances 
the post-Foucauldian study of biopolitics. Whilst building upon Foucault’s earlier work on biopower, 
this approach explores how the operations of biopower are also changing because the ‘vital 
epistemics’ of the life sciences have further evolved and transformed since he first penned those 
influential studies. Biopower today no longer operates solely along the axes of the individual human 
body or the population in the way Foucault originally postulated. It now also operates through the 
logics and scale of the molecular; and just as the extraction of human labour under capitalism 
required the development of new tactics and strategies governing the body, so too the subsequent 
shift to the ‘molecular’ bioeconomy has triggered modifications, re-configurations, and further re-
contouring of state-market relations. Those, we have seen, include the increased flow of public 
funding to the life science for generating new molecular knowledges, the rise and intensification of 
intellectual property to enable the commodification of such molecular technologies, the 
development and geographic expansion of new regimes for the international protection of such 
intellectual property, and the creation of new political economies specifically for medical 
countermeasures development in the area of civilian biodefense. Studying the political economy of 
molecules thus reveals that it is not merely ‘life’ itself, or indeed the ‘biological’ more generally, that 
is pertinent to political economy. How exactly we come to think about and know ‘life’ actually 
matters just as profoundly in the end. 
Nor is there any reason to assume that this ‘molecular’ shift will be the last such 
permutation in the underlying bios of biopower. Moving forward, the study of international political 
economy will also have to explore how other significant transformations in those ‘vital epistemics’ 
come to contour political economy. Scientific ‘anomalies’ are already beginning to accumulate at the 
frontiers of biology, particularly in the fields of epigenetics and genomics, that are leading some 
scientists to openly question the ‘central dogma’ of molecular biology, and who are now pointing to 
the need to return to more holistic understandings of cell and life processes (see Shapiro 2009). 
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There are, in other words, likely to be further shifts in our ‘vital epistemics’ to come, and with 
potentially equally significant ramifications for political economy. Even the broader notion of ‘life’ 
itself possesses historicity in the end. Indeed, it is easy to forget that as late as the eighteenth 
century the concept of ‘life itself did not exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed 
through a grid of knowledge constituted by natural history’ (Foucault 2005 :139). Looking forward, 
we must therefore ask not just what might come ‘after’ the molecular framing of life; but also what 
comes after ‘life’ itself? 
Attending to the play of molecules in the world also challenges, secondly, the division 
between the human and the non-human worlds in the study of political economy. Molecules exist 
both within and outside of the human body, and continuously traverse the boundary between the 
human and the non-human worlds. Indeed, the molecular vision of life powerfully reconnects 
human existence with the wider natural world by reconceptualising and re-coding all things living on 
this planet as being united, traversed and defined by common ‘molecular’ foundations. Looking back 
from the vantage point of this molecular perspective, Foucault’s account of biopower thus begins to 
appear unduly anthropocentric, with its particular focus on individual human bodies (discipline) and 
the collective body of the population (biopolitics). Attending to the ‘molecular’, by contrast, moves 
the analysis of biopower in a decidedly more post-human direction by cultivating greater sensitivity 
to the intricate relationship between human life and the wider natural world (Haraway 1997; Hayles 
1999; Barad 2007; Thacker 2009; Wolfe 2010; Braidotti 2013).  
Approaching the study of political economy with such a post-human sensibility further opens 
up the possibility that non-human objects and artefacts – like molecules – can also possess particular 
kinds of agency in the world. Their ‘agency’ is evidently not a traditional humanistic one, conceived 
of as a deliberative and reflexive capacity located ‘inside’ any particular agent. On the contrary, the 
‘agency’, ‘power’, or ‘force’ of molecules stems precisely from all of the exterior relations that 
coalesce around, emerge from, converge upon, and flow through them. ‘Power’, McKeen-Edwards 
and Porter (2013: 26) argue, ‘does not only involve the absolute possession of deployable 
capabilities by an actor, but also involves the ability of actors to enrol networks of human and 
objects that might be engaged in other activities’. Molecules exhibit such a distributed enrolment 
power by provoking a wide and diverse array of actors to coalesce around them in the quest to 
create new forms of commercial and security value. By their very existence molecules have thus 
engendered what Deleuze and Guattari (1984) once referred to as ‘desiring machines’, and have 
brought about systematic shifts in state-market relations across the fields of both global health and 
biodefense. Yet these are just two, if highly significant, domains amongst many; and there is still 
plenty of scope to further explore the political economy of molecules in other prominent ‘bio’-
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domains that similarly form part of the global molecular assemblage – like agriculture, food 
production, climate management, energy security, biofuels, and so forth. Such further research too 
would help to show just how much molecules have come to matter, how the world is a different 
place today because of the discovery of molecules, and how we therefore need to cultivate a more 
post-human international political economy.  
All of this, finally, will also require new and creative approaches for studying international 
political economy. Tracing the lively, forceful and post-human play of molecules has quickly 
unearthed a vexing constellation of challenges that resist easy conceptualization, but that will 
undoubtedly also resonate in other areas of political economy. Those include the ways in which 
heterogeneous human and non-human actors come together to form loose and open-ended unities, 
how phenomena and processes connect with each other across extreme scalar variations, and the 
role of desire in driving the transformation and adaptation of assemblages. Assemblage thinking has 
been able to help navigate many of those challenges. Along the way, it has opened up creative ways 
of thinking about ‘agency’ and ‘power’, whilst also challenging some of the long-standing hierarchies 
and binaries in the field (e.g. micro/macro, non-human/human, desire/reason). Much like we can 
start reading a map from pretty much any point on it, so too assemblage thinking reveals the 
multiple ways and scales at which we can enter the study of international political economy. Moving 
forward, assemblage thinking thus shows considerable promise for enhancing the field’s ability to 
identify unconventional, multi-scalar and hitherto overlooked connections in the study of political 
economy – making for a livelier and more experimental study of political economy, even rendering it 
strange once more.  
In relation to the political economy of molecules, those methodological precepts developed 
through assemblage thinking have already revealed that political economy is always shaped and 
contoured by the generative force of our deeper onto-epistemic conceptions of life. That, in the end, 
marks another reason why markets can never be completely ‘free’. Not only do markets always 
require some form of government support for their creation and ‘smooth’ functioning. Not only do 
‘free’ markets also demand extensive government intervention to fulfil an array of needs in the area 
of national security. Markets are also never completely free because they are always already 
bounded by our deeper understandings of life. Perhaps nothing is more central to political economy 
in the end than the idea that life has a truth, and that we can come to know this truth. In this way, 
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